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Abstract
We study whether the effects on registered manufacturing output of dismantling
the License Raj – a system of central controls regulating entry and production
activity in this sector – vary across Indian states with different labor market reg-
ulations. The effects are found to be unequal across Indian states with different
labor market regulations. In particular, following delicensing, industries located
in states with proemployer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those
in proworker environments.
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In the post-war period, planned industrialization became a widespread development
strategy for tackling economic backwardness. However, in the 1980’s, amidst growing
dissatisfaction about its results, many developing countries progressively liberalized their
economies by dismantling government controls over industry and opening up to trade.
Despite the pervasiveness of these reforms, there is little sound empirical evidence on
whether and how they interact with local institutions. The same nationwide reform
could lead to quite different outcomes depending on the local institutional environment
in which it takes place.
The aim of this paper is to examine the interaction between product market deregula-
tion and the organization of labor markets in India. We focus on a little studied internal
liberalization episode, the dismantling during the 1980’s and 1990’s of the License Raj
– a system of central controls introduced in 1951 regulating entry and production ac-
tivity in the registered manufacturing sector. Delicensing reforms were staggered over
a decade, but were nationwide in scope – when an industry was delicensed, the policy
change affected all Indian firms in that industry, irrespective of location. The focus of
our analysis is on whether institutional differences across Indian states, particularly in
labor market regulations, led to a differential response in the industrial performance to
the reform across states.
Our main finding is that, after delicensing, industries located in states with proem-
ployer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in proworker environ-
ments. This result stands up to a wide variety of robustness checks. Since proworker
regulations are, on average, associated with weaker industrial performance, our study
shows that dropping barriers to investment and entry via delicensing magnified the dis-
advantage of states with proworker labor market institutions.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. First, several recent papers argue
that the impact of procompetitive reforms on economic performance will vary signifi-
cantly depending on the technological and institutional environment in which they take
place (Philippe Aghion et al. 2005; Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, and Fabrizio
Zilibotti 2006).1 Second, there is a literature which studies the effect of labor or entry
regulation on economic performance (Thomas Holmes 1998; Marianne Bertrand, and
Francis Kramarz 2002; Simeon Djankov et al. 2002; Timothy Besley, and Robin Burgess
2004; Ricardo J. Caballero et al. 2005; Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Peter Klenow 2007).
1In a similar spirit the recent trade literature has studied how heterogeneous firms and industries
react differently to trade liberalization (James Tybout, Jaime de Melo, and Vittorio Corbo 1991; Nina
Pavcnik 2002; Marc Melitz 2003; Daniel Trefler 2004; Andrew Bernard, Stephen Redding, and Peter
Schott 2007; Eric Verhoogen 2007).
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Finally, a recent literature analyzes the interaction between product market and labor
market regulations (Olivier Blanchard, and Francesco Giavazzi 2003; Alejandro Cunat,
and Marc Melitz 2005).
The paper is structured as follows. Section I provides the relevant historical back-
ground and describes how the different data series are constructed. Section II contains
the empirical analysis of the links between delicensing, labor regulation environment and
industrial performance. Section III concludes.
I. Background and Data
The centerpiece of centrally-planned industrialization in India was the Industries (De-
velopment and Regulation) Act of 1951 which brought all key industries in the registered
manufacturing sector under central government control via industrial licensing. Under
the Act an industrial license was required to establish a new factory, significantly ex-
pand capacity, start a new product line or change location (see Rabindra K. Hazari
1966; Jagdish Bhagwati, and Padma Desai 1970; P.L. Malik, 1997). This allowed the
government to allocate plan production targets to firms. We use statements on indus-
trial policy, press notes and notifications issued by the federal government to code when
different three-digit industries were exempted from industrial licensing.2
During the 1980s and the 1990s, there were two main waves of reforms. The first
occurred in 1985 after Rajiv Gandhi’s unexpected rise to power following the assassina-
tion of his mother Indira in 1984. He was an airline pilot with no political experience
whose reformist attitude was largely unexpected (Dani Rodrik, and Arvind Subramanian
2004). It was under his government that around one third of all three-digit industries
were delicensed in 1985. The second wave of reform was launched in 1991 under the
regime of Narasimha Rao, who came to power following Gandhi’s assassination in an
election campaign which subsequently returned the Congress party to government. The
1991 liberalization was prompted by a balance of payment crisis and by the external
pressure of the IMF that imposed a structural adjustment program. Industrial licensing
was effectively abolished in 1991 except for a small number of industries where it was
retained “for reasons related to security and strategic concerns, social reasons, problems
related to safety and overriding environmental issues, manufacture of products of haz-
ardous nature and articles of elitist consumption” (Government of India 1991). As with
2See Table 1 for summary statistics of the main variables and the Data Appendix for further informa-
tion on variable definitions and data sources. Figure A1 of the Appendix, displays when each three-digit
industry was delicensed. Table A1 provides the detail on how each three-digit industry was coded and
Table A2 provides the concordance between the 1970 and 1987 industrial classification systems.
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the case of Gandhi, the depth of the reformist tendencies of the Rao government was
largely unanticipated. There are few instances of delicensing away from the leadership
transitions in 1985 and 1991.3
From 1991 onwards tariff barriers were also progressively reduced and restrictions on
foreign direct investment (FDI) relaxed (Pravin Krishna, and Mitra 1998; Petia Topalova
2005). It is therefore important for us to separate the effects of delicensing from those
of trade and FDI liberalization. To capture trade liberalization we construct a measure
of the actual tariff rate applied by customs officials at the Indian border by combining
auxiliary and countervailing rates of duty for each three-digit industry between 1980 and
1997. These provide us with a direct measure of the evolving Indian trade policy regime
and enable us to control for the effects of trade liberalization in our regressions. To
capture FDI liberalization we record, from 1991 onwards, how many six-digit products
within a three-digit industry were opened to automatic approval of FDI (up to 51 percent
equity). Our measure takes a value of zero before 1991 when FDI was strictly controlled.
In Table 1 we see that our applied tariff is high and relatively flat across the 1980-1990
period and then falls dramatically after 1990. The FDI reform measure increases after
1990 following the relaxation of controls on foreign investment.
We match our delicense, tariff and FDI reform measures with state-industry panel
data on the registered manufacturing sector for the period 1980-1997 drawn from the
Annual Survey of Industries.4 This is the most disaggregated level at which one can
obtain representative data on industrial performance across the pre- and postdelicensing
periods. The sampling unit is a state and three-digit industry pair, so that the data
are representative at the state-three-digit industry level. To minimize the role played by
industry entry and exit in explaining our results we restrict our attention to a balanced
panel of state-industries on which data exist for all eighteen years of our data set.
Moreover, since we are interested in comparing cross-state within-industry performance,
we restrict attention to industries that exist in at least five states in each year of the
sample. This gives us 18,324 observations on an average of 64 three-digit industries in
each of the 16 main Indian states over an 18-year time period.5 These sixteen states
3The 1985 and 1991 reforms covered, respectively around one third and one half of three-digit
industries. About one tenth of three-digit industries had not been delicensed by 1997 (see Figure A1 of
the Appendix).
4Under the Factories Act of 1948 enterprises are required to register if either they have more than
ten employees and electric power or have more than twenty employees and no electric power. Smaller
enterprises below these size thresholds are classified as part of unregistered manufacturing and are not
covered by the Annual Survey of Industries. In our sample period, registered manufacturing makes up
about 9 percent of total state output and unregistered manufacturing around 5 percent.
5We check that all our results are robust to running regressions on an unbalanced panel where
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account for over 95 percent of the Indian population.
As India is a federal democracy and industrial relations fall under the joint jurisdic-
tion of central and state governments in the Indian constitution, labor market regulations
differ across states. The key piece of central legislation is the Industrial Disputes Act
of 1947 which sets out the conciliation, arbitration and adjudication procedures to be
followed in the case of an industrial dispute. This Act has been extensively amended
by state governments during the post-Independence period. Thus, although all states
have the same starting point, they have diverged from one another over time. Following
Besley and Burgess (2004) we code each state amendment as neutral (0), proworker
(+1) or proemployer (-1). Having obtained the net direction of amendments in any
given year, we cumulate the scores over time to give a quantitative picture of how the
regulatory environment evolved over the 1947-1997 period.
There is heterogeneity in both the level and change of labor regulation across our
1980-1997 sample period. The most extreme proworker state, West Bengal, has labor
regulation values which rise from +2 to +4 over the 1980-1997 period. Three other states
(Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa) are also recorded as beginning the period as proworker or
amending in this direction. The most extreme proemployer state, Andhra Pradesh, has
a score that varies from -2 to -3 across our period. Four other states (Kerala, Rajasthan,
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka) begin the period as proemployer or amend in that direction.
There are six neutral states (Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh) that begin the period at 0 and do not amend in either direction. Finally,
Madhya Pradesh is neutral in all years except for a proemployer change in 1982 which
is reversed by a 1983 proworker amendment.6
Labor regulations, industrial licensing and the Annual Survey of Industries only apply
to registered manufacturing. Our data are therefore well-suited to examine how product
market deregulation, in the form of delicensing, interacts with heterogeneous state-level
labor institutions in shaping the pattern of industrial development across Indian states.
industries are in the data for at least ten years and are active in at least five states. This raises our
sample size to 24,374 observations.
6Figure A2 in the Appendix displays the state-wise variation in labor regulation across the 1980-1997
sample period.
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II. Empirical Analysis
A. Method
Our interest centers on the delicense-labor regulation interaction coefficient which cap-
tures the role of state-specific labor regulation in mediating the impact of the delicensing
reform on industrial performance. To examine this interaction we estimate a regression
of the form:
(1) yi,s,t = αi,s + ηi,t + βs,t + θ(di,t)(rs,t) + εi,s,t
where yi,s,t is the logarithm of three-digit state-industry real output, di,t is a dummy
variable which takes the value of unity in the year a three-digit industry is delicensed and
then stays on thereafter, rs,t is the labor regulation measure measured in state s at time
t, αi,s are state-industry interactions which control for any unobserved time-invariant
determinants of state-industry performance (e.g. natural endowments, location), ηi,t are
industry-year interactions which control for differential industry-specific time effects (e.g.
technological innovation), βs,t are state-year interactions which control for differential
state-specific time effects (e.g. macro shocks), and εi,s,t is a stochastic error. The
coefficient of interest (θ) is identified by the mix of industry-year variation in delicensing
interacted with state-year variation in labor regulation.
We cluster the standard errors by state and year of delicensing. This is not only to
address serial correlation concerns (and to allow for heteroskedasticity) but also to take
account of the fact that delicensing is highly clustered in time. Delicensing happened
overwhelmingly in 1985 and 1991, implying that different industries within a state in
these years cannot be treated as independent observations.
B. Results
If the licensing system was acting as a barrier to entry we would expect its removal to be
associated with an increase in entry in delicensed relative to still-licensed industries. The
inclusion of industry-year and state-year interactions in equation (1) precludes estimat-
ing the average effects of delicense and labor regulation as these vary at the industry-year
and state-year level respectively. We therefore begin our analysis by presenting in Ta-
ble 2 results for a specification where the industry-year and state-year interactions in
equation (1) have been replaced with year fixed effects and where the delicense-labor reg-
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ulation interaction term has also been omitted. In column (1), we find that delicensing
leads to a statistically significant increase in the number of factories within an industry
of around 6 percent.7 The delicensing reform therefore does appear to have encouraged
entry. In column (2) we include labor regulation as an additional regressor. The coef-
ficient on labor regulation is negative and significant, indicating that states that have
moved in a proworker direction experience less net entry relative to proemployer states.
The coefficient on delicense remains positive and significant, and of a similar magnitude.
Delicensing and proworker labor regulation are thus pulling in opposite directions in
determining the number of factories operating in state-industries.
Columns (3) and (4) use the same specification to examine the average effects of
delicensing and labor regulation on output. In column (3), we find a positive, but
not statistically significant effect of delicensing. The small average effect on output,
however, may be masking substantial heterogeneity of delicensing effects depending on
the institutional conditions in Indian states. Output may have risen in some states
and fallen in other states in response to the same nationwide delicensing reform. To
examine this possibility we added interactions between state fixed effects and delicense
to the specification in column (3) of Table 2. We find that the coefficient on this
interaction is positive in nine states and negative in seven states – delicensing led to a
rise in output in some states and a fall in output in other states (relative to industries
where licensing was retained).8 We also find a similar pattern of effects for employment
and fixed capital – the average effect of delicensing is small and insignificant but hides
considerable heterogeneity across states.
A key question concerns which characteristics of states affect how industries located
within their borders respond to delicensing. Of particular interest, are policies and
institutions over which state governments exercise some control. In column (4) of Table
2 we find that regulation in a proworker direction is associated with lowered output
relative to regulating in a proemployer direction. This lines up with a growing body
of evidence which suggests that labor regulation affects industrial performance across
Indian states.9
7Unfortunately, we do not observe separate entry and exit flows, but changes in the number of
factories operating in a state-industry provide us with a measure of net entry.
8Eleven of the sixteen delicense-state interactions are statistically significantly different from zero at
the 5 percent level. We can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on delicense is the same across
states at the 1 percent level. In the interest of brevity we do not report the individual coefficients on
the delicense-state interactions.
9Besley and Burgess (2004) show that states which amended in a proworker direction in the pre-1992
period experienced lowered output, employment, investment and productivity in registered manufac-
turing. In contrast, output in unregistered manufacturing increased. Labor regulation therefore seems
to be capturing something specific to the institutional environment facing firms in registered manufac-
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In this paper we examine whether state-specific labor institutions mediated the im-
pact of the nationwide delicensing reform on industrial performance across Indian states.
Column (1) of Table 3 presents results from estimating a regression of the form described
in equation (1). The delicense-labor regulation interaction coefficient is negative and sig-
nificant indicating that, when delicensing occurred, industries in states with proemployer
regulation experienced larger increases in output relative to those located in proworker
states.10 This is the key result in the paper. Given the demanding nature of the speci-
fication this is compelling evidence that labor regulations passed over time at the state
level affected how industries responded to a nationwide delicensing experiment.11
We checked that our findings are not driven by individual states by sequentially
excluding each state from the sample and reestimating the column (1) specification of
Table 3. In each case the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between delicense
and labor regulation remains significant at the 5 percent level and is not statistically
significantly different from the estimate for the full sample. This suggests that our
results capture a general relationship between industrial performance, delicensing and
labor market institutions rather than the influence of individual states.
A potential concern is that state labor regulations are responding to changes in indus-
trial development following delicensing. Therefore, column (2) considers a specification
where we interact delicense with state labor regulations in 1980 before delicensing oc-
curred. State-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded and cumulated
from 1947, so column (2) examines whether predelicensing cross-state variation in labor
regulation affected how industries responded to delicensing in subsequent years. The
interaction coefficient continues to be negative and significant and of similar magnitude
to the column (1) result, indicating that industries located in states classified as proem-
ployer in 1980 tended to grow more quickly, relative to their counterparts in proworker
states, after they were delicensed.
To provide further evidence against a feedback from industrial development to la-
bor regulation, we exploit the instrumental variables estimation strategy of Besley
turing. Unfortunately data on unregistered manufacturing is not available at the state-industry level
across our sample period.
10We find a similar result for a specification that includes state-industry interactions and year fixed ef-
fects (see column (1) of Table A3 in the Appendix). The delicense-labor regulation coefficient (standard
error) is -0.070 (0.018).
11A model developed in the working paper version of the paper helps us to understand this key result.
Delicensing encourages firm entry and expansion but more so in proemployer states. The falls in price
that ensue lead to exit and contraction of less productive firms particularly in proworker states. The
net effect is a reallocation of economic activity towards proemployer states (see Philippe Aghion, Robin
Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti 2006).
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and Burgess (2004). Following a Supreme Court ruling, which found Indira Gandhi’s
Congress party guilty of election fraud, she imposed martial law and suspended elections
between 1975 and 1977. When state elections resumed she and her party were heavily
punished – ten of the sixteen states in our data switched from Congress to Noncongress
majorities. The new governments brought new ideas and we observe an increase in
labor regulation activity following this political shock. We use interactions between a
post-1977 dummy variable and pre-1977 mean unionization in a state and between the
post-1977 dummy and patterns of land tenure in British India (from Abhijit Banerjee,
and Lakshmi Iyer 2005) as our two instruments for state labor regulation. Unionization
and historical land tenure both affected how politics had evolved in each state and hence
the direction of labor regulation when political competition intensified post-1977.
Our IV strategy is to predict labor regulation using a first-stage regression, which
includes our two instruments, state fixed effects and year fixed effects, for the period
1958-1997.12 We then interact the predicted value of labor regulation with delicense
and include it in our second-stage regression. The result is in column (3) of Table 3.13
The estimated coefficient on the delicense-labor regulation interaction is of a similar
magnitude to that in column (1) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level,
supporting our interpretation of the interaction term as capturing the role of state-
specific labor regulation in determining the heterogeneous impact of delicensing.
In Column (4) we include a set of interactions between each state fixed effect and
delicense. These interactions control for all fixed state characteristics which affect how
industries respond to delicensing, including cross-state differences in labor regulation
at the beginning of our sample period. The identification of the delicense-labor regu-
lation interaction coefficient now solely comes from changes in labor regulation during
the sample period. Even with this limited variation (see Figure A2 in the Appendix)
the coefficient remains negative and significant indicating that, after being delicensed,
industries located in states which moved in a proemployer direction experienced greater
output growth relative to those located in states which moved in a proworker direction.
When we reestimate the specification from column (1) of Table 3 for two alternative
measures of industrial performance – total employment and fixed capital – we find similar
magnitudes of interaction effects. The estimated delicense-labor regulation coefficients
(standard errors) are -0.050 (0.019) and -0.054 (0.020) respectively. Therefore proworker
12The F statistic on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression is 7.27 (this is a state-year
regression, with standard errors clustered on state), indicating that the instruments have some power
in explaining the direction of labor regulation.
13Standard errors in column (3) have been corrected to take account of the fact that predicted labor
regulation is generated in a first-stage regression.
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states experience less employment growth and investment relative to proemployer states
following delicensing.
Our results demonstrate that liberalization had unequal effects across Indian states,
and accentuated the importance of labor regulation in determining the trajectory of
industrial activity in India. To gauge the economic significance of our findings we con-
struct a counterfactual of what would have happened to the distribution of output across
Indian states had delicensing had no heterogenous effects in states with different labor
regulations. To do this we first construct fitted values for log output using the spec-
ification in column (1) of Table 3. We next construct a counterfactual series for log
output without heterogeneous effects of delicensing (by falsely assuming that θ = 0 in
column (1) of Table 3).14 Taking exponents and summing across industries within each
state allows us to compare the evolution of state output with and without heterogeneous
effects of delicensing (see Figure A3 in the Appendix).
The largest relative increases in output following delicensing are found in Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the states with the most proemployer labor regulations. Out-
put in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, is around 11 percent higher in 1997 relative
to the counterfactual. In contrast, output in West Bengal and Maharashtra, the states
with the most proworker regulations, is 19 percent and 10 percent lower. Similar results
are found for employment and fixed capital.15
Collectively these results paint a consistent picture. State labor regulations affected
in a sizeable fashion the relative development of registered manufacturing across Indian
states following the delicensing episodes of the 1980’s and 1990’s.
C. Robustness
Liberalization in 1991 in India came as a package. Trade tariffs were reduced and
restictions on foreign direct investment were relaxed at the same time that the second
wave of delicensing was taking place. These reforms were enacted centrally and vary
across industries and time (see Krishna and Mitra 1998; Topalova 2005). Table 4 checks
whether our delicense-labor regulation result is robust to controlling for interactions
between these other industry-year varying elements of the liberalization package and
labor regulation.
14Since industry-year and state-year interaction effects absorb, respectively, the level effects of deli-
censing and labor regulation, the difference between the fitted and counterfactual series can only identify
the heterogeneous effects of delicensing.
15Our estimates imply that, relative to the counterfactual, employment in 1997 is 10 percent higher
in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and 18 percent lower in West Bengal. Similarly fixed capital is 11
percent higher in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and 20 percent lower in West Bengal.
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We begin by examining the interaction between our tariff measure and labor regula-
tion. In a specification with state-industry interactions and year dummies this interac-
tion is positive and significant suggesting that tariff reductions led to output expansion
in proemployer states relative to proworker states.16 This result, however, is not robust
to controlling for industry-year and state-year interactions as is shown in column (1) of
Table 4. In column (2) we include the interaction of labor regulation with both tariff
and delicense alongside one another. The delicense-labor regulation interaction remains
negative and significant (and of the same magnitude as in column (1) of Table 3), in-
dicating robustness to controlling for the interaction of trade liberalization with labor
regulation. When we include both FDI reform-labor regulation and tariff-labor regula-
tion interactions in column (3), we find that neither are significant. In column (4) we
include our FDI reform measure interacted with labor regulation alongside the delicense-
labor regulation and tariff-labor regulation interactions. We find that the delicense-labor
regulation interaction remains significant (and of similar magnitude to our earlier result
from column (1) in Table 3). Our central finding is therefore robust to controlling for
the interaction of both trade liberalization and FDI reform with labor regulation.
Table 5 checks whether our delicense-labor regulation result is robust to controlling
for interactions between delicensing and other time-varying state policies and charac-
teristics. In column (1) we include the interaction of delicense with state development
expenditure and with a measure of state financial development. Development expendi-
ture includes state spending on health, education and infrastructure and helps crudely
to measure differences in state government investment in these activities across time.
For financial development we use the instrumented state-level bank branch expansion
measure from Robin Burgess, and Rohini Pande (2005). This captures the expansion
of bank branch networks into locations with no banks across Indian states driven by
the introduction (in 1977) and removal (in 1990) of a branch licensing rule.17 This
mitigates concerns that financial development is endogenous to industrial development
whilst controlling for this potentially important determinant of industrial performance
(see Daron Acemoglu, and Fabrizio Zilibotti 1997; Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt, and
16See column (3) of Table A3 in the Appendix. We also find a negative but statistically insignificant
average effect of tariffs on output which lines up with the weak direct effects of delicensing on output
that we observe in Table 2 (see column (2) of Table A3).
17Between 1977 and 1990 the Indian Central Bank imposed a licensing rule which required that for
each branch opened in a banked location four had to be opened in unbanked locations. Burgess and
Pande (2005) use the number of bank branches per capita in 1961 interacted with (i) a post-1976 time
trend and (ii) a post-1989 time trend as instruments for state-level bank branch expansion. Standard
errors in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 have been adjusted to take account of the fact that predicted
financial development is generated in a first-stage regression.
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David Mayer-Foulkes 2005; Kalina Manova 2006).
The coefficient on the delicense-development expenditure interaction in column (1)
of Table 5 is positive and significant suggesting that within each industry, states with
larger development expenditures tend to gain more from the delicensing reform relative
to those that spend less. The delicense-financial development coefficient is also positive
and significant suggesting that states which had expanded access to finance benefited
from delicensing relative to those where bank branch expansion had been less marked.
The coefficient on the delicense-labor regulation interaction, however, remains negative
and significant, and similar in magnitude to column (1) of Table 3, when we include
these controls.
Labor market regulations may also be correlated with the technological level of in-
dustries in a given state. To address this concern we construct a dummy for whether a
state-industry is in the top, middle or bottom tercile of the cross-state distribution of
labor productivity for a given year. We then interact the top and bottom-tercile dum-
mies with our delicense measure omitting the middle-tercile interaction which serves as
a reference. In column (2) of Table 5 (which also contains the development expendi-
ture and financial development controls from column (1)) we see that being in the top
tercile is associated with a larger increase in output after delicensing relative to being
in the middle tercile.18 Being in the bottom tercile is associated with smaller increases.
Both effects are large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. Technological
level clearly has a bearing on which state-industries in a three-digit sector benefit from
delicensing. Controlling for technology, however, has little effect on the delicense-labor
regulation interaction term which remains negative and significant and of similar mag-
nitude to column (1) of Table 3. The direction of labor regulation in a state does not
appear to be just proxying for how technologically advanced industries in a state are.
Many aspects of the policy environment are difficult to measure. In column (4) of
Table 3 we have shown that our results are robust to including delicense-state interac-
tions which control for the role that unobserved time-invariant state characteristics play
in mediating the impact of delicensing. Omitted interactions between delicense and un-
observed time-varying state policies, however, remain a concern. As a further robustness
check, we therefore add in controls for the political complexion of states on the grounds
that policies towards the registered manufacturing sector are likely to be correlated with
18This finding is consistent with the theory of Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) who argue
that the removal of entry barriers favors the performance of firms and industries that are closer to the
technological frontier, while it may harm less advanced ones. See also Philippe Aghion and Rachel
Griffith (2005) for corresponding UK evidence.
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political outcomes. We expect past political outcomes to matter as they determine the
attitude towards business that prevails in the bureaucracy and polity. This attitude
will affect a range of policy actions that we cannot observe in our data. We therefore
assemble a picture of each state’s “political history” as measured by the number of years
since 1957 that particular political groupings have held a majority of the seats in the
state legislature. The relevant groupings for this exercise are: the Congress party, hard
left parties, regional parties Janata parties and Hindu parties. The results are in column
(3), which also contains the full set of controls for development expenditure, financial
development and technology from columns (1) and (2). The coefficient on the interaction
between delicense and labor regulation remains negative and significant and of similar
magnitude to column (1) of Table 3 when we control for the interaction between deli-
cense and state political histories. The same result holds if we use the contemporaneous
share of seats held in state assemblies in these five groupings interacted with delicense.19
The timing of delicensing varies across industries. A natural question to ask is
whether the actual year in which industries are delicensed matters. To investigate this
we run a Monte Carlo simulation in which we draw a random year in which an industry
is delicensed from the empirical distribution of delicensing years. We do this for each
three-digit industry, thus creating a random or “placebo” delicense measure. We repeat
this process to generate one hundred placebo delicense measures. For each of the placebo
measures the probability of an industry being delicensed in a given year matches that
in the actual data but we randomize over the identities of industries.
In a first falsification exercise we then estimate our regression specification (1) using
the placebo delicense measures in the place of our actual delicense measure. In ninety-
three of the one hundred regressions, we find that the placebo delicense-labor regulation
interaction has a lower absolute t statistic than the actual delicense-labor regulation
interaction (from column (1) of Table 3). In a second falsification exercise we include
both the actual and placebo delicense measures interacted with labor regulation in our
regression specification (1). The actual delicensing-labor regulation interaction is signif-
icant at the 5 percent level in ninety-eight of the one hundred regressions, whereas the
placebo delicense-labor regulation interaction is significant at the 5 percent level in only
19As part of a wider sensitivity analysis, not reported in the paper, we included all of the following
additional variables interacted with delicense in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5: (i) the constituent
health, education and other expenditure elements of development expenditure (to more finely control
for state-government spending behavior), (ii) the proportion of people below the poverty line in a state
(to capture overall backwardness), (iii) state-specific differences between industrial and agricultural
electricity tariffs (to capture cross-subsidization of agriculture) and (iv) cumulative state land reform
acts from Besley and Burgess (2000) (to capture how prorural a state was). In all these regressions the
delicense-labor regulation interaction remains negative and highly significant.
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seven of the regressions. The results of both falsification exercises serve as compelling
evidence that the actual timing of when industries are delicensed is central to our main
empirical result.
A final concern is that the sequencing of delicensing may be driven by the underlying
performance of industries. The fact that delicensing was a centrally-managed techno-
cratic reform which was, in part, triggered by largely unexpected shocks (Gandhi’s
sudden rise to power and the IMF-imposed structural adjustment program under Rao)
helps to allay the concern that industries may have acted in anticipation of economic
reforms. However, the industries that were delicensed in different waves may have been
selected according to some characteristics related to performance potential. In partic-
ular, reformers in 1985 may have not chosen industries randomly. The concern is less
severe for the 1991 wave as this covered most of the remaining industries, and the cri-
terion for the exclusion of a few industries was their strategic, environmental and social
importance. Endogenous sequencing would be a problem for analyzing the impact of
delicensing if the selection criterion were correlated with the expected future perfor-
mance of state-industries at the time of the reform.20 As a crude check on this we ran
a cross-section regression of the year in which a three-digit industry was delicensed on
output growth in that industry during the 1980-84 period (prior to the first wave of
delicensing). This is intended to detect whether politicians selected industries in 1985
according to their degree of economic success. We find no evidence of a relationship
between when an industry is delicensed and prereform output growth (the estimated
coefficient of interest is -0.383, and the standard error is 1.436). Similar results are
found using other measures of prereform industrial performance such as employment or
labor productivity growth during 1980-84.21 The absence of systematic differences in
prereform economic performance between industries that are delicensed in each of the
two waves is reassuring.
III. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the extent to which the effects on registered manufacturing
output of dismantling the License Raj – a system of central controls governing entry
and expansion in this sector – vary across Indian states with different labor market reg-
20The fact that our interest centers on the delicense-labor regulation interaction helps somewhat in
this regard. To explain our main result from column (1) of Table 3, endogenous selection would have to
be based upon an industry’s expected strong performance in proemployer states and/or expected weak
performance in proworker states.
21The regression coefficients (standard errors) are, respectively, -0.74 (1.57) and 0.23 (1.25).
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ulations. To do this we employ a difference-in-difference econometric specification that
includes state-industry, industry-year and state-year interactions to control for a variety
of unobserved effects. The main finding is that output rose more in proemployer states
than it did in proworker states in response to the same delicensing reform. This central
result stands up to a wide variety of robustness checks and the delicense-labor regulation
interaction coefficient is similar in size and significance across a range of specifications.
Delicensing resulted in a sizeable reallocation of industrial production from states with
proworker labor institutions to states with proemployer labor institutions. A policy
implication of our analysis is that liberalization tends to make the creation of a more
favorable investment climate a more pressing concern. This may require complementary
institutional reforms as well as redistributive policies that ease the costs of adjustment
associated with liberalization.
15
A Data Appendix
Our data set on output, number of factories, employment and fixed capital covers an
average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 main states over an 18-year time period
and comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).22 To this data set we add the
following variables.
Delicense: Appendix II of The Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951
reports a comprehensive list of the “Scheduled Industries” subject to industrial licensing
(Malik 1997). All key manufacturing sectors are covered by the 1951 Act. We assigned
three-digit codes to the scheduled industries listed in the Act and used Press Notices and
Notifications issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to track when three-digit
industries were delicensed during the 1980s (see Shri Chaudhary 1987; Government of
India’s Economic Surveys, and the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics 1987).
The Statement of Industrial Policy of 1991 disbanded industrial licensing except for a
small number of specified industries. Subsequent revisions to the list of licensed indus-
tries from 1991 onwards were tracked from Press Notices and Notifications published in
various issues of the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics.
Labor regulation: This measure is based on state-specific text amendments to the
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 reported in Malik (1997). Our coding of amendments fol-
lows Besley and Burgess (2004): 0 denotes a change judged not to affect the bargaining
power of either workers or employers, 1 is a proworker change, and −1 denotes a proem-
ployer change. Where there was more than one amendment in a year we code the net
direction of change thus restricting our measure to take a value of 0, 1,−1 in any given
state and year. These measures are then cumulated over the 1947-1997 period.
Tariffs and FDI reform: Data on actual rates of duty are from the Customs Tariff
of India manuals published through the Central Board of Excise and Customs. Prior to
1988, the basic, auxiliary and countervailing duties are reported for approximately one
thousand one hundred products of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN). From 1988
onwards, even more finely-detailed data are available for approximately five thousand
six-digit products of the Harmonized System (HS). We combine the three rates of duty
according to the official formula23 and then aggregate product rates to the three-digit
industry average using the mapping of Bibek Debroy, and A. T. Santhanam (1993).
Data on when different HS six-digit products are opened to automatic FDI approval for
22The Indian industrial classification changes in 1987. We establish a concordance from the 1970
classification to the 1987 classification to create a consistent state-industry panel across the 1980-1997
period (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
23Applied tariff = basic + auxiliary + (100+ basic + auxiliary)× (countervailing)/100.
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up to 51 percent of equity is from the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics.
Control variables: State development expenditure is from the Public Finance
Statistics published by the Ministry of Finance. Our measure of state financial develop-
ment is from Burgess and Pande (2005). The data on political histories come from state
election data published by the Election Commission of India. State poverty headcounts
are from the National Sample Survey. State cumulative land reforms are from Besley
and Burgess (2000). Agricultural and industry electricity tariff data comes from Annual
Report on the Working of State Electricity Boards and Electricity Departments.
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 1980 1985 1990 1997 1980-1997 
Delicensing      
Percentage of three-digit industries delicensed 0 36.61 39.29 91.07 73.48 
Percentage of real output delicensed 0 47.68 56.94 92.57 74.53 
Percentage of employment delicensed 0 43.05 47.81 88.15 68.31 
Labor Regulation      
Labor Regulation -0.16 -0.05 0.13 0.13 0.04 
 (1.04) (1.42) (1.65) (1.65) (1.52) 
Trade Liberalization      
Tariff Rate 119.19 142.31 132.53 47.58 117.62 
 (44.74) (47.69) (38.94) (21.34) (49.22) 
FDI Reform      
FDI Reform 0 0 0 0.35 0.14 
    (0.39) (0.30) 
Industrial performance      
Mean log real output 11.47 11.88 12.31 12.68 12.13 
 (1.96) (1.93) (1.96) (2.20) (2.02) 
Mean log number of factories 3.30 3.42 3.50 3.58 3.46 
 (1.34) (1.29) (1.30) (1.36) (1.32) 
Mean log employment 7.22 7.37 7.46 7.55 7.43 
 (1.70) (1.57) (1.58) (1.69) (1.61) 
Mean log real fixed capital 9.78 10.39 10.74 11.27 10.61 
 (2.12) (2.03) (2.12) (2.46) (2.20) 
Observations 1018 1018 1018 1018 18324 
Notes: The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 
to 1997.  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations across state-industries. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then 
cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. Tariff rate is the tariff rate applied to a three-digit registered manufacturing industry. FDI reform is a variable which before 1991 is 
equal to zero and after 1991 is equal to the fraction of Harmonized System 6-digit products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of foreign direct investment (FDI) for up to 51 
percent equity. Real output is real registered manufacturing output in thousands of rupees (1981 prices). Number of factories is number of registered manufacturing factories. Employment is number 
of registered manufacturing employees. Real fixed capital is real registered manufacturing fixed capital stock in thousands of rupees (1981 prices). See the Data Appendix for further information on 
variable definitions and the data sources. 
  
 
Table 2: Average Effects of Delicensing on Industrial Performance in India: 1980-1997 
Notes: The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 
to 1997. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at 
the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. Log no. factories is log number of registered manufacturing factories. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. 
Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 
1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the 
data sources. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Log No. 
Factories 
Log No. 
Factories 
Log Real Output Log Real Output 
Delicense 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.032 0.031 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.042) (0.043) 
Labor Regulation   -0.062** 
(0.027) 
 -0.137*** 
(0.044) 
Observations 18324 18324 18324 18324 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 
State-industry interactions YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
  
 
 
Table 3: Delicensing, Labor Regulation and Industrial Performance in India: 1980-1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
 
Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output 
Delicense × Labor Regulation -0.054**   -0.202** 
 (0.024) (0.078) 
Delicense × 1980 Labor Regulation -0.062*
 (0.035)
Delicense × Instrumented Labor Regulation -0.068**
 (0.030)
Observations 18324 18324 18054 18324 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
State-industry interactions YES YES YES YES 
State-year interactions YES YES YES YES 
Industry-year interactions YES YES YES YES 
State-delicense interactions YES 
Notes: The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 
to 1997. The difference in the number of observations between column (3) and the other columns of the table is due to the absence of unionization data for Jammu and Kashmir, which implies that 
instrumented labor regulation is missing for Jammu and Kashmir. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense 
is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 
0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. 1980 labor regulation is the labor regulation measure of states as of 1980. Instrumented labor 
regulation is predicted from a state-year regression for 1958-97 in which the instruments are interactions between a post-1977 dummy variable and pre-1977 mean unionization in a state and between 
the post-1977 dummy and patterns of land tenure in British India (from Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). The F-statistic for the significance of the excluded instruments in the first-stage state-year regression 
is 7.27. The Hansen-Sargan overidentification test regresses the residuals from the second-stage state-industry-time regression on interactions between the instruments and delicense. The instruments 
pass the overidentification test with a p-value of 0.255. Standard errors in column (3) are corrected for instrumented labor regulation being generated in a first-stage regression. See the Data Appendix 
for further information on variable definitions and the data sources. 
  
 
 
 
Table 4: Trade Liberalization, FDI Reform, Labor Regulation and Industrial Performance in India: 1980-97 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output 
Delicense × Labor Regulation  -0.059***  -0.059** 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Log Tariff Rate × Labor Regulation 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
FDI Reform × Labor Regulation   -0.007 -0.010 
   (0.038) (0.036) 
Observations 17783 17783 17783 17783 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
State-industry interactions YES YES YES YES 
State-year interactions YES YES YES YES 
Industry-year interactions YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 
to 1997. The difference in the number of observations between Table 4 and Table 3 is due to the fact that there are a small number of three digit industries for which tariff data is unavailable. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * 
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is 
delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral and -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to 
generate the labor regulation measure. Log tariff rate is the log tariff rate applied to a three-digit industry. FDI reform is a variable which before 1991 is equal to zero and after 1991 is equal to the 
fraction of Harmonized System 6-digit products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of foreign direct investment (FDI) for up to 51 percent equity. See the Data Appendix for 
further information on variable definitions and the data sources. 
  
Table 5: Robustness to Interactions with State and State-Industry Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log Real 
Output 
Log Real Output Log Real Output 
Delicense × Labor Regulation -0.051** -0.064** -0.064*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) 
Delicense × Log Development Exp 
 
0.188* 
(0.105) 
-0.113 
(0.101) 
-0.118 
(0.126) 
Delicense × Financial Development 0.030** 0.029* 0.047** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) 
Delicense × Top Industry Productivity Tercile  0.472*** 0.474*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) 
Delicense × Bottom Industry Productivity Tercile  -0.521*** -0.523*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) 
Delicense × Congress Majority    -0.006 
   (0.005) 
Delicense × Hard-left Majority    0.005 
   (0.020) 
Delicense × Regional Majority   0.003 
   (0.006) 
Delicense × Janata Majority   0.006 
   (0.019) 
Delicense × Hindu Majority   0.072 
   (0.081) 
Observations 18324 18324 18324 
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.93 
State-industry interactions YES YES YES 
State-year interactions YES YES YES 
Industry-year interactions YES YES YES 
Notes: The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 
to 1997. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at 
the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit 
industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral and -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-
97 to generate the labor regulation measure. Log development expenditure is real per capita state spending on social and economic services. Financial development is from Burgess and Pande (2005) 
who use the number of bank branches per capita in 1961 interacted with (i) a post-1976 time trend and (ii) a post-1989 time trend as instruments for state-level bank branch expansion for the 1961-
2000 period.  We use predicted financial development from this state-year regression interacted with delicense above. The F-statistic for the significance of the excluded instruments in the first-stage 
state-year regression is 16.87. Standard errors in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 have been adjusted to take account of the fact that predicted financial development is generated in a first-stage 
regression. Top industry productivity tercile is a dummy which is one if a state-industry lies in the top third of the cross-state within-industry labor productivity distribution each year and zero 
otherwise. Bottom industry productivity tercile is a dummy which is one if a state-industry lies in the bottom third of the cross-state within-industry labor productivity distribution and zero otherwise. 
Congress, hard left, regional, Janata and Hindu majority are counts of the number of years for which these political groupings held a majority of the seats in the state legislatures since 1957. See the 
Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data source. 
Figure 1 : The Timing of Delicensing in India 1980-97
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Notes: The figure displays the years in which different three-digit registered manufacturing industries in India were delicensed over the 1980-97 period. The 
industries shown in the Never column had not been delicensed as of 1997. Numbers refer to three-digit registered manufacturing codes from the Indian National 
Industrial Classification (NIC) 1987. See Table A1 and the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data sources.
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Notes: State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded: 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and cumulated from 1947-97.
Vertical lines denote the two waves of delicensing in 1985 and 1991. See the data appendix for further details on the variables and data sources.
Figure 2: Labor Regulation in India 1980-97
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Notes: For each Indian state we display the ratio of fitted state output (from column (2) of Table 3) to counterfactual state output obtained by setting
the delicense-labor regulation interaction to zero in this specification. The fitted-counterfactual ratio has been multiplied by one hundred to be
expressed as a percentage.  Deviations from a value of one hundred are attributable to the heterogeneous effects of delicensing across states
due to their different labor market regulations. Since industry-year and state-year effects absorb, respectively, the level effects of delicensing
and labor regulation, the difference between the fitted and counterfactual series can only identify the heterogeneous effects of delicensing.
Vertical lines denote the two waves of delicensing in 1985 and 1991.
Figure 3: The Unequal Effects of Delicensing in India 1980-97
Nic 3 Year delicensed IDRA Industry Reason Delicensed
200 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
201 1991 Food-processing industries (milk products) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
202 1985 Food-processing industries (canned fruits) "Canned fruits" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
203 1985 Food-processing industries (other) "Marine products" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
204 1986 Food-processing industries (flour) "Roller flour milling industry" mentioned in Press Note issued in July 1986
205 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
206 0 Sugar "Sugar" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
207 0 Sugar "Sugar" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
208 1991 Salt (under processed food) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
209 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
210 1985 Vegetable oils and vanaspati "Vegetable oils" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
212 1985 Vegetable oils and vanaspati "Vegetable oils" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
213 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
214 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
215 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
216 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
217 1985 Food-processing industries (other) "Cattle feed" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
218 1991 Food-processing industries (other) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
219 1985 Food-processing industries (malted food, other) "Protein foods" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
220 0 Fermentation industries "Distillation and Brewing of alcoholic drinks" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
221 0 Fermentation industries "Distillation and Brewing of alcoholic drinks" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
222 0 Fermentation industries "Distillation and Brewing of alcoholic drinks" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
223 0 Fermentation industries "Distillation and Brewing of alcoholic drinks" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
224 1991 Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
225 0 Miscellaneous industries (tobacco) "Tobacco and Substitutes" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
226 0 Miscellaneous industries (tobacco) "Tobacco and Substitutes" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
227 0 Miscellaneous industries (tobacco) "Tobacco and Substitutes" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
229 0 Miscellaneous industries (tobacco) "Tobacco and Substitutes" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
230 1991 Textiles (cotton) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
231 1991 Textiles (cotton) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
232 1991 Textiles (cotton) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
233 1991 Textiles (cotton) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
234 1991 Textiles (cotton) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
235 1991 Textiles (cotton) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
236 1991 Textiles (cotton-dying/printing) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
240 1991 Textiles (silk, synthetic, artificial) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
241 1991 Textiles (wool) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
242 1991 Textiles (wool) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
243 1991 Textiles (wool-dying) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
245 1991 Textiles (silk) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
246 1991 Textiles (silk) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
247 1991 Textiles (artificial) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
248 1991 Textiles (artificial-dying/printing) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
250 1991 Textiles (jute) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
254 1991 Textiles (jute) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
257 1991 Textiles (fibre) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
258 1991 Textiles (fibre) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
259 1991 Textiles (fibre) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
260 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
261 1991 Textiles (ropes) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
262 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
264 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
265 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
266 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
267 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
268 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
269 1991 Textiles (various) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
270 1997 Timber products (miscellaneous) "Wood-based products" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991- Later delicensed in 1997
271 1997 Timber products (plywood) "Plywood" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991- Later delicensed in 1997
272 1997 Timber products (miscellaneous) "Wood-based products" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991- Later delicensed in 1997
273 1997 Timber products (miscellaneous) "Wood based products" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991- Later delicensed in 1997
274 1991 Timber products (miscellaneous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
275 1991 Timber products (miscellaneous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
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276 1991 Timber products (miscellaneous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
277 1991 Timber products (miscellaneous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
279 1991 Timber products (miscellaneous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
280 1985 Paper and pulp "Paper and pulp" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
281 1985 Paper and pulp "Paper and pulp" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
283 1985 Paper and pulp "Paper and pulp" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
284 1991 Printing and publishing of newspapers Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
285 1985 Printing "Printing" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
286 1985 Printing "Printing" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
287 1991 Engraving, etching, and block-making Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
288 1991 Book binding on account of others Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
289 1985 Printing "Printing" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
290 1993 Leather, leather goods and pickers "Raw hides " mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991- Later delicensed in 1993
291 1991 Manufacture of footwear Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
292 1985 Leather, leather goods and pickers "Leather goods" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
293 1985 Leather, leather goods and pickers "Leather goods" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
294 1997 Leather, leather goods and pickers "Tanned or dressed furskins" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991- Later delicensed in 1997
295 1991 Leather, leather goods and pickers Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
296 1991 Leather, leather goods and pickers Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
299 1985 Leather, leather goods and pickers "Leather goods" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
301 1991 Fertilisers Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
303 1991 Chemicals (Paints, varnishes) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
304 1985 Drugs and pharmaceuticals "List of drugs" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
305 1985 Soaps, cosmetics and toilet preparations "Soap and cosmetics" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
306 1985 Chemicals (industrial gases, man-made fibres) "Industrial gases" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
307 0 Timber products (matches) "Matches" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
308 0 Chemicals (explosives) "Explosives" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
309 1986 Chemicals (fine) "Fine chemicals" mentiones in Press Note issued in September 1986
310 1989 Rubber goods (tyres and tubes) "Tyres and tubes" mentioned  in Press Note 1989
311 1991 Rubber goods (footwear) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
312 1985 Rubber goods (surgical) "Surgical instruments" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
313 1985 Miscellaneous mechanical and engineering industries (plastic moulded goods) "Plastic moulded goods" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
316 0 Fuels "Petroleum and its distillation products" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
317 1991 Fuels Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
318 0 Fuels (coke and derivatives) "Coal and lignite" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
319 0 Fuels (coal and lignite) "Coal and lignite" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
320 1985 Ceramics (refractories) "Refractories" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
321 1985 Glass "Glassware" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
322 1985 Ceramics (pottery) "Pottery" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
323 1985 Ceramics (sanitary ware, insulators) "Sanitaryware, insulators" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
324 1991 Cement and gypsum products Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
325 1991 Cement and gypsum products Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
326 1991 Cement and gypsum products Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
327 1997 Cement (asbestos) "Asbestos" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991-later delicensed in 1997
329 1991 Miscellaneous non-metallic mineral products Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
331 1985 Metallurgical industries (ferrous-iron and steel) "Sponge Iron" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985, "Pig Iron" 
mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
332 1991 Metallurgical industries (ferro-alloys) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
333 1991 Metallurgical industries (non ferrous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
334 1991 Metallurgical industries (non ferrous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
335 1991 Metallurgical industries (non ferrous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
336 1991 Metallurgical industries (non ferrous) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
339 1985 Metallurgical industries (castings and forgings) "Iron forgings" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985, "Castings 
and forgings" mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
340 1991 Fabricated structural metal products Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
342 1985 Metallurgical industries (ferrous-iron and steel products) "Steel furniture" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
343 1985 Miscellaneous mechanical and engineering industries (hand tools) "Hand tools" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985
344 1985 Metallurgical industries (castings and forgings) "Castings and forgings" mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985
345 1991 Metallurgical industries (semi-manufactures and 
manufactures) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
346 1985 Commercial,office and household equipment (cutlery, pressure cookers)
"Pressure cooker, cutlery" mentioned in Press Note issued in December 
1985
349 1991 Metallurgical industries (semi-manufactures and 
manufactures) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
350 1985 Agricultural machinery
351 1985 Industrial machinery-Earth moving machinery "Industrial machinery"  mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
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352 1985 Primer movers "Steam turbines" mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
353 1985 Industrial machinery "Industrial machinery"  mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
354 1985 Industrial machinery "Industrial machinery"  mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
355 1993 Commercial,office and household equipment (Air-
conditioners and refrigerators)
"White goods" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991-later 
delicensed in 1993
356 1985 Industrial machinery (general items) "Water pumps"  mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
357 1985 Industrial machinery (general items) "Industrial machinery"  mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985 
358 1985 Commercial,office and household equipment (typewriter, calculating machines) "Office equipment" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
359 1985 Industrial machinery (general items) "Industrial sewing machines-office equipment"  mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
360 1985 Electrical equipment "Electrical equipment" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
361 1991 Electrical equipment (cables and wires) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
362 1991 Electrical equipment (storage batteries, dry cells) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
366 1985 Telecommunications (+ some household/office 
equipment)
"Magnetic tapes, broadcasting equipment" mentioned in Press Note issued 
in December 1985 
367 1985 Electrical equipment (household appliances) "Computer peripherals" mentioned in Press Note issued in December 1985
368 1985 Electrical equipment (household appliances) "Electronic components" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
369 1985 Electrical equipment (lamps, x-ray equipment) "Electronic components" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
370 1991 Transportation(ships) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
371 1991 Transportation(railway locomotives) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
372 1991 Transportation(railway rolling-stock) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
374 1985 Transportation(automobiles) "Automotive ancillaries" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
375 1985 Transportation(cycles) "Cycles" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
376 1985 Transportation(bicycles) "Cycles" mentioned in Press Note issued in March 1985 
377 0 Transportation(aircraft) "Electronic aerospace equipment" mentioned in Compulsory Licensing list 1991
378 1991 Transportation(others) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
379 1991 Transportation(others) Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
380 1985 Medical and surgical appliances, Industrial, 
mathematical instruments
"Industrail and Scientific instruments" mentioned in Press Note issued in 
March 1985 
381 1991 Photographic, cinematographic and optical goods Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
382 1991 Manufacture of watches and clocks Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
383 1991 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
384 1991 Minting of currency coins Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
385 1991 Manufacture of sports and athletic goods Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
386 1991 Manufacture of musical instruments Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
387 1991 Manufacture of stationery articles Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
388 1982 Electrical equpiment "Equipment for exploitation of alternate sources of energy" mentioned in Press Note January 1982
389 1991 Manufacture of miscellaneous products Delicensed in the Statement on Industrial Policy of 1991 
Notes: a year delicensed of "0" indicates that an industry had not been delicensed by 1997.
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Table A2: Trade Liberalization, FDI Reform, Labor Regulation and Industrial Performance in India, 1980-97 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output Log Real Output 
Delicense      0.064
     
   
     
     
   
    
  
   
    
     
(0.044)
Labor Regulation -0.306*** -0.184*
(0.100) (0.106)
Delicense × Labor Regulation -0.060*** -0.059**
(0.018) (0.024)
Log Tariff Rate -0.015 -0.015 -0.020
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Log Tariff Rate × Labor Regulation 0.041** 0.009 0.025 0.008
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
FDI Reform 0.226*** 0.237*** 0.242***
(0.084) (0.079) (0.078)
FDI Reform × Labor Regulation -0.038 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010
(0.030) (0.038) (0.028) (0.036)
Observations 17783 17783 17783 17783 17783
R-squared      
     
0.89 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.92
State-industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
State-year fixed effects YES YES
Industry-year fixed effects YES YES
Standard errors Cluster     
   
Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
State×ydel State×ydelState×ydel State×ydel State×ydel
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 
5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. Log Real Output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit 
industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. Log Tariff Rate is the log tariff rate applied to a three digit industry. FDI reform is a variable which before 1991 is equal to zero and after 
1991 is equal to the fraction of Harmonized System 6-digit products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for up to 51 percent equity. State 
amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. The data set is a balanced 
panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. The difference in the 
number of observations between Table A2 and Table 3 of the paper is due to the fact that there are a small number of three digit industries for which tariff data is unavailable. See the Data Appendix 
for further information on variable definitions and the data sources.
